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ISSUE
Under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952, does an accused pat-
ent infringer need to know of the existence of the patent to actively 
induce its infringement? 
FACTS
SEB S.A., (SEB) the respondent, and the plaintiff below, owns U.S. 
Patent No. 4,995,312 (the ‘312 patent), titled “Cooking Appliance with 
Electric Heating.” The ‘312 patent differed from other deep fryers 
on the market because its plastic covering (the “skirt”) prevented 
contact with the metal frying pan that contained the cooking oil. This 
allowed users to handle the appliance without burning themselves. 
The product that embodied the claims of the ‘312 patent, as well as  
its other competitors, was popularly referred to as the “cool-touch” 
deep fryer.  
Sunbeam Products, Inc., a competitor of SEB, asked Pentalpha Enter-
prises Co. (Pentalpha), a subsidiary of the Petitioners Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc., to produce a competing deep fryer. As Pentalpha had 
not previously manufactured such a deep fryer, Pentalpha “reverse-
engineered” a number of the items produced by Sunbeam’s competi-
tors, included the SEB’s cool-touch deep fryer. Pentalpha substantially 
relied on the SEB’s cool-touch deep fryer as its model, only making 
minimal structural and cosmetic improvements. Pentalpha’s chief 
executive, John C. K. Sham, claims that the examined copy of the 
“cool-touch” deep fryer did not contain any indications that it was an 
embodiment of the ‘312 patent.
After completion of its modified deep fryer, Pentalpha hired a patent 
attorney in New York to conduct research into whether Pentalpha’s 
deep fryer would infringe any existing patents protected in the United 
States. In doing so, Pentalpha did not inform its attorney that it had 
used the SEB fryer as a close model. After a patentability search, the 
patent attorney provisionally assured Pentalpha that its deep fryer 
did not infringe any existing patents in the United States; however, 
the patent attorney’s search did not include a examination of the ‘312 
patent. After this search, Pentalpha began selling its deep fryers to 
Sunbeam, Fingerhut Corporation, and Montgomery Ward, to be sold in 
the United States under their respective trademarks.
Upon receiving information about these events, SEB sued Pentalpha, 
as well as the suppliers who had bought the fryers for patent infringe-
ment under the Patent Act of 1952. Among its claims, SEB alleges that 
that Pentalpha actively induced Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and Montgom-
ery Ward to infringe SEB’s patent under § 271(b) of the Patent Act. 
Section 271(b) states that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement 
of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 
The case proceeded to a jury trial after SEB obtained a preliminary 
injunction against Pentalpha preventing sale of its deep fryers. Upon 
the close of testimony, Pentalpha moved to dismiss the case as a judg-
ment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to the claim of active inducement 
since SEB had not produced any direct evidence that any Pentalpha 
employee had actual knowledge of the ‘312 patent. 
The district court denied Pentalpha’s motion. Furthermore, the 
district court instructed the jury that active inducement of infringe-
ment under § 271(a) occurs only if the “[d]efendants actively and 
knowingly aided and abetted” the other companies to infringe. The 
court further charged the jury that “[p]laintiff must show that the 
Defendants actually intended to cause the acts that constitute direct 
infringement and that the Defendants knew or should have known 
that their actions would induce actual infringement.” Among a variety 
of other claims, the jury also found that Pentalpha actively induced 
infringement under § 271(b) of the Patent Act.
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CASE AT A GLANCE 
In this case, the Supreme Court will consider the state of mind necessary to establish liability for actively 
inducing the patent infringement of another under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act. Global-Tech contends 
that a party that induces infringement must have actual knowledge of the disputed patent while SEB 
maintains that the party must only show deliberate indifference or willful blindness to the existence of a 
known patent to demonstrate that a party has actively induced others to infringe a patent.
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Pentalpha appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit on a number of grounds, amongst them, the district court’s denial 
of the JMOL at the close of testimony, as well as its subsequent jury 
instructions. 
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its holding from DSU 
Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006), that the basic 
standard for active inducement is “that the alleged infringer knew 
or should have known that his actions would induce actual infringe-
ments.” The Federal Circuit then clarified that this test for “active 
inducement” could be satisfied if it is shown that there was a deliber-
ate indifference to a known risk that a product could infringe upon 
a disputed patent. Applying this test, the Federal Circuit held that 
Pentalpha’s failure to disclose its disassembly and copying of SEB’s 
deep fryer to its patent attorney was “highly suggestive” of deliberate 
indifference. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the determina-
tion below. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court granted Pentalpha’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari. 
CASE ANALYSIS
In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether the state of 
mind necessary to prove active inducement of infringement under  
§ 271(b) includes a deliberate indifference to risk that an action may 
induce infringement by others. In doing so, the Supreme Court will 
likely examine whether its earlier holding, in MGM Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), that a claim of common law copy-
right infringement must be proven by a “clear expression or other af-
firmative steps,” applies with equal validity within the patent context.  
Initially, Pentalpha proposes that actively inducing infringement 
under § 271(b) should be interpreted to require “purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct” that encourages others’ infringement. Thus, 
according to Pentalpha, active inducement under § 271(b) cannot 
occur unless direct evidence shows that a company had actual knowl-
edge of the disputed patent to be infringed. 
Pentalpha contends its proposed test is supported by Grokster as well 
as the structure and legislative history of the Patent Act. First, Pen-
talpha suggests that the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Grokster 
suggested that it should be applied within the copyright and patent 
context and moreover that infringers must act with a deliberate pur-
pose within the contributory infringement context. Second, as to the 
structure of the Patent Act, Pentalpha suggests that any standard less 
than this state-of-mind requirement would render § 271(c), which 
provides for contributory infringement when a manufacturer provides 
a component for another item that infringes upon a patent, meaning-
less because a patent owner could sue component part manufacturers 
for active inducement without having to prove the additional ele-
ments of a § 271(c) claim. 
Finally, in regards to the legislative history, Pentalpha highlights a 
Senate Report that describes active inducement as “an expression 
both of law and morals.” Pentalpha employs this language to claim 
that such a high standard is suggested by the text of § 271(b), itself, 
which applies to parties that “actively induce” infringement, rather 
than simply aiding and abetting of infringement.
Pentalpha also raises at least two policy claims to support its interpre-
tation of § 271(b). First, Pentalpha claims that broadly defining active 
inducement liability would allow patent owners to enforce an issued 
patent granted in the United States against parties in other countries. 
This is contrary to the general presumption against the extraterrito-
rial application of the law of the United States in other countries. 
Second, Pentalpha contends that the Federal Circuit’s deliberate 
indifference standard would create unpredictability since almost 
any defendant could be held liable for active inducement despite the 
absence of a culpable state of mind. 
In its reply, SEB challenges Pentalpha’s legal and policy claims. 
Initially, SEB attempts to distinguish Grokster as a case that involved 
contributory infringement, rather than the specific statutory scheme 
at stake in § 271. In the alternative, SEB suggested that even if 
Grokster did create a rule governing active inducement of patent 
infringement, the behavior of Pentalpha met the standard outlined by 
the Supreme Court. SEB contends that Grokster found liability against 
defendants that did not know of any specific copyrights, but whom still 
advertised a file-sharing service that promoted its ability to permit 
infringing behavior on the part of its customers. SEB notes that here, 
while Pentalpha may have lacked “actual” knowledge of the patents, 
its conduct was no less culpable given its reverse-engineering of 
SEB’s patented product, its failure to disclose to its patent attorney 
that it copied SEB’s fryer, and sale of its fryers even after learning of 
SEB’s patent. 
Furthermore, SEB counters Pentalpha’s assessment of the statutory 
structure and legislative history of § 271(b) and claims they were 
insufficient. SEB bases this claim on its reading of the text of  
§ 271(b) and the overall structure of the Patent Act. SEB draws  
three key inferences from its reading. First, SEB contends the text of 
§ 271(b) indicates that no express scienter, or knowledge, require-
ment is necessary to prove active inducement. According to SEB, this 
indicates that the text of § 271(b) is closer to that of § 271(a), whose 
text also lacks such an express requirement. Second, SEB claimed 
that even if § 271(b) contains an express scienter requirement, it is 
a lower one than the requirement outlined in § 271(c). Finally, in the 
alternative, SEB states that § 271(b) must require a lower level of 
intent than “willfulness,” which is the intent required for an award of 
enhanced damages and attorney’s fees under § 284, otherwise, every 
violation of § 271(b) would trigger enhanced damages and attorney’s 
fees. SEB argues its textual analysis of § 271(b) was also consistent 
with the legislative history of the Patent Act. In particular, SEB main-
tains that Congress in 1952 intentionally determined to find a lesser 
scienter requirement of “active” rather than what it claims to be the 
higher standard of “willful.” 
Finally, SEB responds to Pentalpha’s policy concerns. SEB first argues 
that requiring direct evidence of actual knowledge would effectively 
make patent owners prove that the potential infringer had actual 
knowledge of the disputed patents. This is often a particularly heavy 
evidentiary burden, particularly when circumstantial evidence is 
the only method a patent owner has to pursue an active inducement 
claim. Moreover, SEB cautions the Supreme Court, without the threat 
of infringement liability, that a ruling in Pentalpha’s favor would give 
foreign manufacturers a “roadmap” to infringe American patents with 
impunity. This would disrupt the role that § 271(b) was intended to 
play within the overall intellectual property regime. 
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SIGNIFICANCE
The Federal Circuit has struggled to define when a party actively in-
duces the patent infringement of others under § 271(b) of the Patent 
Act. Two options exist, either the potential infringer must have actual 
awareness of the existence of the disputed patent, or the potential 
infringer knew or should have known of the existence of the disputed 
patent.  
The lack of clarity, in many respects, starts with the textual framework 
of the Patent Act itself. Section 271(b) simply states that a person can 
be liable for “actively inducing infringement” without providing any 
definition to judge that particular use. This lack of clarity is ampli-
fied in two additional ways. First, the Federal Circuit itself has not 
completely settled on a definition of the knowledge requirement for 
active inducement. Second, the Supreme Court in Grokster offered a 
definition of contributory infringement within copyright context that 
may conflict with the more detailed infringement framework of § 271 
of the Patent Act.
Thus, Global-Tech offers the Supreme Court a useful way to clarify 
this particular area of patent law. 
Kali Murray is an assistant professor at Marquette University Law 
School and member of its Intellectual Property Program. She can be 
reached at kali.murray@marquette.edu.
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